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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 16-1709 
______________ 
 
PHENG KUANG NA, 
 
         Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA, 
 
          Respondent 
 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision 
and Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (BIA No. A 088-646-122) 
Immigration Judge:  Steven A. Morely 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 6, 2016 
 
BEFORE:  SHWARTZ, COWEN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  December 14, 2016)   
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent 
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 Pheng Kuang Na petitions for review of an order entered by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal from the order of the 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum and for withholding of 
removal.  We will dismiss Na’s petition in part and deny it in part. 
I. 
 Na, a native and citizen of Indonesia, was admitted to the United States on 
November 11, 2005 as a nonimmigrant visitor with authorization to remain until May 6, 
2006.  On January 29, 2008, he was charged as removable as an alien who remained in 
the United States for a time longer than permitted.  Na filed an application for asylum and 
for withholding of removal on September 21, 2010.   
An asylum applicant must file his or her application within one year of arrival, 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), or “demonstrate[ ] to the satisfaction of the Attorney General 
either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s 
eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an 
application within the period specified in subparagraph (B),” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(A)(2)(D).  
“[Na] proffer[ed] that he suffers from PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] and major 
depression . . . and has proffered the affidavit of Dr. Amy Wenzel [a psychologist]” in 
support of his claim of extraordinary circumstances.  (AR192.)  He further claimed that 
he had suffered past persecution as a Chinese Christian and feared that he would suffer 
persecution on account of his ethnicity and religion in the future.  Na submitted various 
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exhibits regarding country conditions, including an affidavit from Dr. Jeffrey Winters (an 
expert on human rights practices in Indonesia).       
 The IJ denied Na’s application, and the BIA dismissed his administrative appeal.  
Na filed a petition for review with this Court (No. 13-3360).  The government moved for 
a remand in lieu of filing a responsive brief.  Specifically, Na argued that the BIA made 
an impermissible factual finding in determining that his asylum application was not filed 
within a reasonable time.  Addressing a 2005 incident in which Na was beaten by an 
Indonesian police officer, the IJ indicated that the loss of a tooth did not constitute a 
serious injury, even though a dentist claimed that he had lost six teeth and that the pattern 
of his missing teeth was consistent with significant trauma to the area.  According to the 
government, “[r]emand would allow the Board to determine whether the ‘reasonable 
time’ determination is a finding it may make in the first instance or whether it is a factual 
finding subject to clear error review.”  (AR79 (citations omitted).)  “Remand would also 
provide the Board an opportunity to clarify whether it affirmed the asylum denial for the 
reasons stated by the immigration judge.”  (AR80.)  This Court granted this motion for a 
full remand.  
 On remand, the BIA yet again dismissed Na’s appeal.  The BIA did not reach the 
question of whether Na filed his asylum application within a reasonable period of time 
given the circumstances because it agreed “with the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that 
the respondent did not meet his burden of proof to show extraordinary circumstances 
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directly related to his failure to timely file his asylum application.” 1  (AR4.)  Even 
though the BIA acknowledged that the IJ clearly erred by finding that Na lost only one or 
two teeth and that the dentist’s report did not indicate that this injury was consistent with 
trauma, it upheld the IJ’s determination that the harm Na suffered in Indonesia did not 
rise to the level of persecution.  According to the BIA, the IJ also appropriately 
determined that Na failed to establish a clear probability he would suffer persecution if he 
returns to Indonesia.            
II. 
 We must dismiss Na’s petition insofar as he challenges the agency’s disposition of 
his asylum application on the grounds of untimeliness.  With the exception of 
constitutional claims and questions of law, we lack the jurisdiction to review such 
determinations.2  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Jarbough v. Attorney 
General, 483 F.3d 184, 188-90 (3d Cir. 2007); Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 
633-35 (3d Cir. 2006).  According to Na, the IJ applied the wrong legal standard by 
requiring him to establish the existence of extraordinary circumstances by a 
preponderance of evidence because “[t]he statute only requires Mr. Na to demonstrate ‘to 
the satisfaction of the Attorney General’ that he qualifies for an exception” and, under the 
applicable regulation, he likewise need only show “‘to the satisfaction of . . . the 
                                              
 1 According to the BIA, the IJ’s clear error in finding that the psychological report 
stated that Na’s wife was still in Indonesia was also harmless because it did not affect the 
BIA’s own conclusion that Na failed to show that his failure to file in a timely fashion 
was due to his mental health issues.    
 2 We otherwise possess jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).  We review 
the agency’s factual determinations under a “substantial evidence” standard.  See, e.g., 
Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561-62 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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immigration judge’ that the circumstances ‘directly related to the failure to meet the 1-
year deadline.’”  (Petitioner’s Brief at 18 (emphasis omitted).)  Nevertheless, our grant of 
jurisdiction is “narrowly circumscribed.”  Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 188 (citations omitted).  
In fact, this “satisfaction” language “implies that the Attorney General’s determination 
entails an exercise of discretion.” Sukwanputra, 434 F.3d at 635 (citing Vasile v. 
Gonzales, 417 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 2005)). The BIA then exercised de novo review 
over the sufficiency of the evidence offered by Na, and it ultimately agreed with the IJ 
that Na did not meet his burden of proof in this case.3  Na further claims that the IJ’s 
ruling was “infected” by a multitude of errors.  (Petitioner’s Brief at 29 (emphasis 
omitted).)  For example, the IJ purportedly ignored the psychologist’s expert findings.  
However, “courts have recognized arguments such as that an Immigration Judge or the 
BIA incorrectly weighed evidence, failed to consider evidence or improperly weighed 
equitable factors are not questions of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D).”  Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 
189 (citing Bugayong v. INS, 442 F.3d 67, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2006); Elysee v. Gonzales, 437 
F.3d 221, 223-24 (1st Cir. 2006); Higuit v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 2006)).   
                                              
 3 Unlike other provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, § 
1158(a)(2)(D) does not specify a burden of proof by which a petitioner must satisfy the 
Attorney General and so leaves the determination of proof needed to the agency.  See, 
e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e)(3) (providing that a petitioner can obtain a visa on the basis of a 
marriage entered into during the time that adjudicative proceedings were pending “if the 
alien establishes by clear and convincing evidence to the satisfaction of the Attorney 
General that the marriage was entered into in good faith.”).  Thus, the burden of proof 
required here is simply an issue of how much evidence that judge deemed necessary to 
establish extraordinary circumstances, which, as noted in the text, we lack jurisdiction to 
review.  See Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 189 (weighing evidence of extraordinary 
circumstances is an unreviewable factual issue for purposes of § 1158(a)(2)(B)).    
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 We otherwise will deny the petition for review because the agency’s denial of 
Na’s withholding application was supported by substantial evidence in the record.  An 
applicant for withholding of removal must establish a clear probability that the 
applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened because of his or her race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.  See, e.g., id. at 
190.  If he or she suffered past persecution, it is presumed that the applicant’s life or 
freedom would be threatened in the future.  See, e.g., id. at 191.  It appears that, in 2005, 
a Native Indonesian police officer (who was looking for Na’s brother because the brother 
was dating a Native Indonesian) attacked Na, bruising him and knocking out six of his 
teeth.  The agency did not commit reversible error by finding that this incident, while 
clearly deplorable and traumatic to Na himself, did not rise to the level of persecution—
“threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they 
constitute a threat to life or freedom.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 2007); 
see also, e.g., Kibinda v. Attorney General, 477 F.3d 113, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding 
that single incident in which petitioner was detained for five days during which time 
petitioner was hit in jawbone by heavy object thrown by guard requiring seven stitches 
did not constitute persecution).  “The respondent did not suffer repeated incidents of 
violence.”  (AR4 (citing Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 614-15 (3d Cir. 2005).)  With 
respect to the probability of future persecution, several years have passed since the 2005 
incident, and “there is no evidence of record that authorities in Indonesia have any 
interest in [Na].”  (AR4.)  In fact, there was no evidence that his brother had been 
attacked since the 2005 incident.  Finally, the agency appropriately disposed of Na’s 
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claim that there was a pattern or practice of persecution against Chinese Christians.  “The 
record shows widespread discrimination, but not pervasive or systemic persecution.”  
(AR5.)  In turn, the State Department 2011 International Religious Freedom Report for 
Indonesia indicated that the Indonesian government generally respected religious 
freedom for the six officially recognized religions (which include Catholicism and 
Protestantism).  See, e.g., Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537-38 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Given 
these considerations, we are not compelled to find that such attacks constitute a pattern or 
practice of persecution against Chinese Christians.” (footnote omitted)). 
III. 
 We will dismiss the petition for review in part and deny it in part.  We will dismiss 
Na’s petition insofar as we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that Na 
did not establish extraordinary circumstances justifying his delay in filing his application.  
Otherwise, we will deny his petition.    
